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The Primary Profit Objective Test:
An Unworkable Standard?
Michelle B. O'Connor
I. INTRODUCTION

One of the underlying themes of the Internal Revenue Code (the
"Code")' is the denial of deductions for personal expenses. Under the
Code, a taxpayer generally may deduct only those expenses paid or
incurred in connection with an activity entered into and carried on for
profit.2 Early in the development of the law of federal income taxation, courts attempted to draw a dividing line between business and
personal expenses. In this attempt, courts considered whether a taxpayer entered into or engaged in an activity with a motive or objective
to generate a profit.3 This examination of a taxpayer's profit motive is
* The author graduated from Washington & Lee University School of Law in 1991.
She served as a law clerk for the Honorable Stephen J. Swift, United States Tax Court,
from 1991 to 1993. She currently works as an associate at Arnold & Porter, of
Washington, D.C.
I. The Internal Revenue Code of 1986 is codified at 26 U.S.C. §§ 1-9722 (1988)
[hereinafter the "Code"].
2. The distinction between personal and business expenditures is summarized in the
Treasury Regulations as follows:
Deductions are allowable under section 162 for expenses of carrying on
activities which constitute a trade or business of the taxpayer and under
section 212 of the Code for expenses incurred in connection with activities
engaged in for the production or collection of income or for the management,
conservation, or maintenance of property held for the production of income.
Treas. Reg. § 1.183-2(a) (1972). Except as provided in § 183 and its corresponding
Treasury Regulation § 1.183-1, the Code does not allow deductions for expenses incurred
in connection with activities not engaged in for profit. Id.
Numerous examples of the distinction between business and personal expenses exist
in the Internal Revenue Code. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 119(a)(2) (1995) (excluding the value
of lodging provided by employer from employee's gross income only if "the employee
is required to accept such lodging on the business premises of his employer as a
condition of his employment"); I.R.C. § 165(c) (1995) (allowing individuals to deduct
only "(1) losses incurred in a trade or business; (2) losses incurred in any transaction
entered into for profit" and (3) certain casualty and theft losses); I.R.C. § 262 (1995)
("Except as otherwise expressly provided in this chapter, no deduction shall be allowed
for personal, living, or family expenses."); I.R.C. § 280A (1995) ("Except as otherwise
provided in this section ... no deduction ... shall be allowed with respect to the use of a
dwelling unit which is used by the taxpayer during the taxable year as a residence.").
3. See, e.g., Aviation Club of Utah v. Commissioner, 162 F.2d 984, 986 (10th Cir.
1947); Seaman v. United States, 156 F.2d 719, 723-24 (7th Cir. 1946); Coffey v.
Commissioner, 141 F.2d 204, 205 (5th Cir. 1944); Paine v. Commissioner, 102 F.2d
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commonly referred to as the "profit objective test." As stated by the
United States Supreme Court:
For income tax purposes Congress has seen fit to regard an
individual as having two personalities: "one is [as] a seeker after
profit who can deduct the expenses incurred in that search; the
other is [as] a creature satisfying his needs as a human and those
of his family but who cannot deduct such consumption and
related expenditures."4
In determining whether a taxpayer's objective in making an investment included profit, courts have applied one of two tests. The majority of courts apply a test which considers whether a taxpayer acted pursuant to "any" or "a"profit objective when she entered into or carried
on the activity in question.5 This test is referred to as the "actual and
honest" test. 6 A number of courts, however, have applied a test that
110, 112 (1st Cir. 1939).
4. United States v. Gilmore, 372 U.S. 39, 44 (1963) (footnote omitted) (quoting S.
SURREY & W. WARREN, CASES ON FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 272 (1960)); see also Adam
D. Chinn, Note, Attacking Tax Shelters: Section 183 Leaves the Farm and Goes to the
Movies, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 89, 89-90 (1986) [hereinafter Tax Shelters] (concluding that
§ 183 of the Code was intended to make a distinction between business expenses and
personal hobby expenses); see also Joel E. Miller, Supreme Court in Portland Golf Club
Reserves on a Key Profit-Intent Question and Adopts a Pervasive Estoppel-by-Reporting
Rule, 15 REV. TAX'N INDIVIDUALS 108, 110 (1991) (explaining that several deduction
provisions of the Code incorporate the "profit/income concept" which allows
deductions only if the taxpayer intended to earn a profit in carrying on an activity) For
further discussion of Portland Golf Club v. Commissioner, 497 U.S. 154 (1990), see
infra notes 36, 114-16, and accompanying text.
Most of the case law considering the profit objective test issue has arisen in the
context of hobbies. Faulconer v. Commissioner, 748 F.2d 890 (4th Cir. 1984),
provides a good example of a typical case that arises in the hobby-loss context. In
Faulconer, the taxpayer incurred substantial losses in five out of seven years in
connection with certain cattle and horse breeding activities. Id. at 891-92. In
considering whether the taxpayer's activities constituted a trade or business, the court
analyzed whether the taxpayer carried on the activity with a profit objective. Id. at 895.
In making its determination, the court considered, by way of example only, the
following factors: (1) the "manner in which the taxpayer carrie[d] on the activity[;]" (2)
the expertise of the taxpayer; (3) "the time and effort expended by the taxpayer in
carrying on the activity[;I" and (4) the income and losses generated by the activity. Id.
at 896-901. However, in recent years, the profit objective test has been increasingly
applied in a purely business context (i.e., a context lacking the recreational aspects
traditionally associated with hobbies). See infra notes 62-64 and accompanying text.
Indeed, many courts have attempted to apply the primary profit objective test in
business situations where significant tax benefits were recognized by a taxpayer. In
many of these "tax shelter" type situations, there is absolutely no recognizable manner
in which a taxpayer might be found to have entered into an activity as a hobby. For a
discussion of these cases, see infra notes 48-54 and accompanying text.
5. See infra notes 55-57 and accompanying text (discussing the application of the
actual and honest test by several lower courts).
6. See, e.g., Smith v. Commissioner, 937 F.2d 1089, 1093 (6th Cir. 1991) ("Under §
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considers whether a taxpayer acted pursuant to a "primary,"
"predominant," "dominant," or "principal" profit objective when she
entered into or carried on the activity in question.7 This test is referred
to as the "primary" test. 8
The primary test, however, presents both practical and theoretical
problems. 9 First, neither the Code nor the regulations require a taxpayer to show that the objective to earn a profit was the most important
reason he or she entered into or carried on an activity.'0 Second, the
restrictive nature of the primary test is incompatible with the reality of
the individual decision-making process." Additionally, its restrictive
183, an activity is engaged in for profit if the taxpayer entertained an actual and honest.
. profit objective by engaging in the activity."); Evans v. Commissioner, 908 F.2d
369, 373 (8th Cir. 1990) (claiming that if an activity was entered into for the actual and
honest purpose of making a profit, it can be considered a trade or business); Burger v.
Commissioner, 809 F.2d 355, 358 (7th Cir. 1987) ("It is well settled that a taxpayer's
expectation of profit need not be reasonable; instead, only a good faith expectation of
profit is required.") (citation omitted). See also infra notes 55-57 and accompanying
text (discussing the actual and honest test).
7. See infra notes 58-101 and accompanying text.
8. See, e.g., Landreth v. Commissioner, 859 F.2d 643, 645 (9th Cir. 1988)
("allow[ing] taxpayers to deduct losses . . . only if they can show that their primary
motive for entering into the transactions was economic profit"); Lamont v.
Commissioner, 339 F.2d 377, 380 n.4 (2d Cir. 1964) ("Words such as 'basic,'
'dominant,' and 'primary,' describ[e] the degree of necessary profit motivation .... ");
Early v. Atkinson, 175 F.2d 118, 122 (4th Cir. 1949) (finding that "purpose to derive a
gain must be the chief or primary one"); Estate of McGlothlin v. Commissioner, 44 T.C.
611, 621 (1965) (stating the "prime motive" for entering a transaction must be the
expectation of profit in order to deduct), aff'd, 370 F.2d 729 (5th Cir. 1967). See also
infra notes 48-54, 58-99, and accompanying text (discussing the primary test).
9. See infra part III.A-B.
10. See infra notes 31-47 and accompanying text (discussing Code § 183 and the regulations thereunder).
11. See infra part IV (discussing the incompatibility of the primary test with the
process of individual decision-making). In a business context, a taxpayer must consider
tax incentives and disincentives when making investment decisions. See infra notes
133-42 and accompanying text (discussing judicial opinions acknowledging that a
taxpayer must necessarily take into account tax incentives when deciding whether or not
to make a particular investment).
Whether tax incentives rank more importantly to a taxpayer than earning a profit
depends upon many variables, such as the risk and potential return of a particular
investment. Congress has recognized the significance of tax incentives on many
occasions by providing tax benefits to encourage certain types of investments that
would be too risky from a purely profit-oriented perspective. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 168
(1995) (providing for accelerated depreciation). Congress originally enacted § 168 in
1981 because Congress believed that the old depreciation rules did not provide "the
investment stimulus that is essential for economic expansion." S. REP. No. 144, 97th
Cong., 1st Sess. 47 (1981), reprinted in 1981 U.S.C.C.A.N. 105, 152; see also I.R.C.
§§ 38(b)(2), 51, 52 (1995) (targeted jobs tax credit); I.R.C. § 42 (1995) (low income
housing tax credit); I.R.C. § 41 (1995) (credit for qualified research activities); I.R.C. §
47 (1995) (tax credit for qualified rehabilitation of certain historic buildings).
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nature creates problems for the courts, the Commissioner, and taxpayers.
Indeed, the primary test provides no workable standard for courts to
use in determining whether an activity is "for profit."'12 The lack of
such a standard is due in part to the inherent difficulty involved in any
comparison of individual motivations. 13 Critics of the primary test
have, accordingly, suggested that the primary test should be limited to
apply solely to the hobby context. 4
Instead of requiring a taxpayer to show that a profit objective induced the taxpayer to enter into or carry on an activity under the primary test, courts should utilize existing judicial doctrines to deal with
investments perceived to be overreaching or abusive. 5 This will
enable courts to curb illegitimate or abusive investment activities without creating and struggling with unworkable standards for determining
the existence of a profit objective.
This Article examines the two tests which courts use to determine
whether a taxpayer has entered into an investment with a profit objective: the actual and honest test and the primary test. First, this Article
reviews the early development of the profit objective analysis by the
courts and examines the statutory measures Congress has employed in
differentiating between business and personal expense deductions and
the corresponding treasury regulations. 6 Next, the Article traces the
judicial development of the profit objective test, focusing on the
primary test. '7 Then, this Article examines how the primary test is
incompatible with an individual's decision to invest 8 and discusses
alternative methods to the primary test for determining profit objective. '9 Finally, this Article concludes that the primary test represents

12. See infra notes 65-99 and accompanying text (discussing difficulties faced by
courts applying primary test).
13. See infra notes 65-99 and accompanying text (discussing different applications
of the primary test by courts).
14. See infra notes 102-07 and accompanying text. Although this Article does not
address fully the considerations involved in the hobby context, such a limitation equally
lacks any statutory basis and is inherently inconsistent with the individual decisionmaking process.
15. See infra notes 148-52 and accompanying text (discussing the existing judicial
doctrines and statutory measures for curbing abuse of tax benefits, such as the sham
transaction doctrine, the step-transaction doctrine, the business purpose doctrine, and
the substance over form doctrine).
16. See infra part II.
17. See infra part II.
18. See infra part IV.
19. See infra part V.
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an unworkable test that should be abandoned by the courts in favor of
other judicial doctrines, specifically the actual and honest test.2'
II. EARLY DEVELOPMENT OF THE PROFIT OBJECTIVE TEST
A. JudicialDevelopment
The profit objective test originated as a doctrine developed by the
courts 21 to distinguish between business and hobby activities for purposes of the business deductions provided under section 16222 and
other Code sections. 23 Courts applying this doctrine generally considered whether an activity was "motivated by a desire for profit. ' 24 To
20. See infra part Vi.
21. See Schley v. Commissioner, 375 F.2d 747, 748 (2d Cir. 1967) (discussing §
165(a) and (c)); Teitelbaum v. Commissioner, 346 F.2d 266, 269 (7th Cir. 1965)
(discussing farm losses); White v. Commissioner, 227 F.2d 779, 780 (6th Cir. 1955)
(discussing § 23(e) of the 1939 Code, the predecessor of § 162 of the 1988 Code), cert.
denied, 351 U.S. 939 (1956); Coffey v. Commissioner, 141 F.2d 204, 205 n.3 (5th Cir.
1944) (discussing operation of farm for recreation); Helvering v. Highland, 124 F.2d
556, 560-61 (4th Cir. 1942) (comparing an estate to an individual for deduction
purposes); Farish v. Commissioner, 103 F.2d 63, 65 (5th Cir. 1939) (finding profit
motive where businessman hired successful horse trainer for race horse business);
Commissioner v. Widener, 33 F.2d 833 (3d Cir. 1929) (concluding that racing stables
were entered into with profit motive because of selective breeding and investment
decisions); Vanderbilt v. Commissioner, 16 T.C.M. (CCH) 1081, 1087 (1957)
(discussing 1939 Code § 23(a)(2) which is similar to 1954 Code § 212). Although the
considerations discussed in this Article generally apply equally to deductions under
§ 212, this Article only addresses § 162.
22. Section 162 of the Code provides, in relevant part, that "[t]here shall be allowed
as a deduction all the ordinary and necessary expenses paid or incurred during the taxable
year in carrying on any trade or business" 1.R.C. § 162 (1995) (amendments not
relevant to the discussion herein have been omitted). There are a number of other Code
sections that require the taxpayer to demonstrate that his or her activity was entered into
or carried on "for profit," such as §§ 165 and 212. However, this Article focuses only on

§ 162.
It is important to note that while § 162 provides the general rule regarding the
deductibility of business expenses, other Code sections provide additional rules
regarding specific expenses, some of which are stricter and some of which are more
permissive than the general rule under § 162. I.R.C. § 162 (1995). For example,
although a taxpayer generally cannot deduct losses on his or her property (such as the
taxpayer's principal residence, car, or other similar real or personal property), § 165(c)
permits the taxpayer to deduct casualty and theft losses not incurred in a trade or business
under certain specified conditions. I.R.C. § 165(c) (1995). While § 162 would appear to
permit deduction of capital losses by a business, § 165(f) limits such losses by
providing that "[l]osses from sales or exchanges of capital assets shall be allowed only
to the extent allowed in sections 1211 and 1212." I.R.C. § 165(f) (1995). Section
121 1(a) in turn permits a corporation to deduct capital losses only to the extent of
capital gains. I.R.C. § 1211(a) (1995).
23. See supra note 2 1.
24. See supra note 21.
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explain the different treatment of business and hobby activities, courts
rationalized that an individual engaged in a hobby activity would more
likely remain in the activity, despite its lack of profitability, than an
individual who engaged in the same activity solely to earn a profit.25
While this presumption may be true, it is also true that taxpayers often
continue a "business" activity long after it has become unprofitable. 6
B. Statutory Measures
Enacted in 1954, section 270 of the Code17 represented an early
attempt by Congress to combat excessive deduction of losses from
hobby activities. Although practitioners and courts commonly referred
to section 270 as the "hobby loss" provision, the name was a misnomer because section 270 on its face applied only to expenses "attributable to a trade or business. 28 Further, section 270, as drafted,
affected very few activities, mainly those of very rich investors who
failed to obtain proper tax advice prior to reporting significant losses,
i.e., those losses of $50,000 or more per year, over a period of five
25. See, e.g., Coffey v. Commissioner, 141 F.2d 204, 205 (5th Cir. 1944)
(comparing a business venture, which is entered into for profit, to a hobby, which is
entered into for pleasure or recreation); Paine v. Commissioner, 102 F.2d 110, 112 (1st
Cir. 1939) (holding the building of a single boat would not be a business venture as
there could not be expectations of profit); Candler v. Commissioner, 76 F.2d 548, 549
(5th Cir. 1935) (determining that a loss could not be deducted as the activity was not
entered into with the "expectation of making a profit").
26. See, e.g., Donald C. Langevoort, Theories, Assumptions and Securities
Regulation: Market Efficiency Revisited, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 851, 859-60 (1992) (discussing the tendency of investors to hold stocks longer than would be expected in light
of the theory that a person will part with an item only if paid a price "substantially
higher" than its cost to that person).
27. Internal Revenue Code of 1954, ch. 736, § 270, 68A Stat. 3, 81 (repealed in
1969). Section 270 of the Code provided in relevant part:
(a) Recomputation of Taxable Income.-lf the deductions allowed by this
chapter or the corresponding provisions of prior revenue laws (other than
specially treated deductions, as defined in subsection (b)) allowable to an
individual (except for the provisions of this section or the corresponding
provisions of prior revenue laws) and attributable to a trade or business carried
on by him for 5 consecutive taxable years have, in each of such years
(including at least one year to which this subtitle applies), exceeded by more
than $50,000 the gross income derived from such trade or business, the
taxable income (computed under section 63 or the corresponding provisions
of prior revenue laws) of such individual for each of such years shall be
recomputed. For the purposes of such recomputation in the case of any such
taxable year, such deductions shall be allowed only to the extent of $50,000
plus the gross income attributable to such trade or business, except that the
net operating loss deduction, to the extent attributable to such trade or
business, shall not be allowed.
Id.
28. See id.
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consecutive years. For the handful of cases to which section 270
actually applied, the provision merely limited the amount of losses that
could be deducted by the taxpayer to $50,000 per year.2 9 However, as
section 270 failed to provide any anti-abuse mechanisms, a taxpayer
could easily shift losses from an activity from one year to another to
avoid reporting losses of $50,000 or more in five consecutive years.
As such, section 270 proved incapable of meeting Congress' goals of
reducing hobby loss deductions. Thus, largely because of its ineffectiveness, Congress repealed section 270 in 1969.30
In the Tax Reform Act of 1969,31 Congress enacted a new hobby
loss provision, found in section 183 of the Code.3 2 Section 183
29. See id.
30. Tax Reform Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-172, § 213(b), 83 Stat. 487, 572
(1969).
31. Tax Reform Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-172, §213, 83 Stat. 487, 571-72
(codified at I.R.C. § 183 (1994)).
3 2. Section 183 of the Code, entitled "ACTIVITIES NOT-ENGAGED IN FOR PROFIT,"
provides:
(a) GENERAL RULE.-In the case of an activity engaged in by an individual or
an S corporation, if such activity is not engaged in for profit, no deduction
attributable to such activity shall be allowed under this chapter except as
provided in this section.
(b) DEDUCTIONS ALLOWABLE.-In the case of an activity not engaged in for
profit to which subsection (a) applies, there shall be allowed(I) the deductions which would be allowable under this chapter for the
taxable year without regard to whether or not such activity is engaged in
for profit, and
(2) a deduction equal to the amount of the deductions which would be
allowable under this chapter for the taxable year only if such activity were
engaged in for profit, but only to the extent that the gross income derived
from such activity for the taxable year exceeds the deductions allowable
by reason of paragraph (1).
(c) ACTIVITY NOT ENGAGED IN FOR PROFIT DEFINED.-For purposes of this
section, the term "activity not engaged in for profit" means any activity other
than one with respect to which deductions are allowable for the taxable year
under section 162 or under paragraph (1) or (2) of section 212.
(d) PRESUMPTION.-If the gross income derived from an activity for 3 or more
of the taxable years in the period of 5 consecutive taxable years which ends
with the taxable year exceeds the deductions attributable to such activity
(determined without regard to whether or not such activity is engaged in for
profit), then, unless the Secretary establishes to the contrary, such activity
shall be presumed for purposes of this chapter for such taxable year to be an
activity engaged in for profit. In the case of an activity which consists in
major part of the breeding, training, showing, or racing of horses, the
preceding sentence shall be applied by substituting "'2" for "3" and "7" for
'5 ".
(e) SPECIAL RULE.
(1) IN GENERAL.-A determination as to whether the presumption
provided by subsection (d) applies with respect to any activity shall, if
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essentially codified the courts' traditional practice of limiting a taxpayer's deductions under section 162 for an activity not "initiate[d] ' or33
conduct[ed] ... in good faith with an intention of making a profit.
Under section 183, a taxpayer may deduct expenses incurred in connection with an activity "not engaged in for profit" (defined as an
activity other than one for which deductions are allowable under sections 162 and 212) to the extent that income generated by the activity
exceeds the deductions allowable to the taxpayer under the other provisions of the Code. 34 Thus, section 183 operates as an allowance
provision authorizing limited deductions with respect to an activity that
does not fall within the classification of a "trade or business. 35 In this
the taxpayer so elects, not be made before the close of the fourth taxable
year, (sixth taxable year, in the case of an activity described in the last
sentence of such subsection) following the taxable year in which the
taxpayer first engages in the activity. For purposes of the preceding
sentence, a taxpayer shall be treated as not having engaged in an activity
during any taxable year beginning before January 1, 1970.
(2) INITIAL PERIOD.-If the taxpayer makes an election under paragraph
(1), the presumption provided by subsection (d) shall apply to each
taxable year in the 5-taxable year (or 7-taxable year) period beginning
with the taxable year in which the taxpayer first engages in the activity,
if the gross income derived from the activity for 3 (or 2 if applicable) or
more of the taxable years in such period exceeds the deductions
attributable to the activity (determined without regard to whether or not
the activity is engaged in for profit).
(3) ELECTION.-An election under paragraph (1) shall be made at such time
and manner, and subject to such terms and conditions, as the Secretary
may prescribe.
(4)

TIME FOR ASSESSING DEFICIENCY ATTRIBUTABLE TO ACTIVITY.-If a

taxpayer makes an election under paragraph (1) with respect to an
activity, the statutory period for the assessment of any deficiency
attributable to such activity shall not expire before the expiration of 2
years after the date prescribed by law (determined without extensions) for
filing the return of tax under chapter I for the last taxable year in the
period of 5 taxable years (or 7 taxable years) to which the election relates.
Such deficiency may be assessed notwithstanding the provisions of any
law or rule of law which would otherwise prevent such an assessment.
I.R.C. § 183 (1995).
33. International Trading Co. v. Commissioner, 275 F.2d 578, 584 (7th Cir. 1960)
(quoting 4 MERTENS, LAW OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 18 (1954)).
34. See I.R.C. § 183 (1995).
35. See id. At first glance, § 183(a) appears to be a disallowance provision because
the plain language of § 183(a) denies a deduction for an activity "not engaged in for
profit." Section 183(c), however, defines an activity "not engaged in for profit" as an
activity for which deductions are not available under § 162 or § 212. Section 183(c)
thus refers the reader to § 162 or § 212 to make the ultimate decision regarding profit
objective. Upon such a determination, § 183(b) (providing certain limited deductions)
may then apply, depending upon the outcome of the determination under § 162 or § 212.
See supra note 32 for the language of § 183.
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way, section 183 represents a continuation of judicial doctrine and
Internal Revenue Service ("IRS") policy permitting taxpayers to deduct
certain expenses incurred in connection with an activity that did not
constitute a "trade or business. 36
The legislative history of section 183 suggests that Congress perceived the judicial profit objective test to be an effective measure to
limit deductions generated by hobby activities. Section 183, as enacted, does not impose any new restrictions on the deductibility of
hobby losses. Instead, it incorporates by reference the profit objective
test. Importantly, the legislative history of section 183 contains no indication that Congress somehow intended to change the existing profit
objective test. 37 The pertinent legislative history of Code section 183
discusses the judicial profit objective test as follows:
[A]Ithough a reasonable expectation of profit is not to be
required, the facts and circumstances (without regard to the
taxpayer's subjective intent) would have to indicate that the
taxpayer entered the activity,38or continued the activity, with the
objective of making a profit.

Perhaps even more importantly, the express language of section 183
refers to "an activity not engaged in for profit., 39 Neither section 183
nor any other section of the Code includes the word "primarily" (or
any other word denoting degree or amount) to describe the requisite
profit objective under section 162.40
36. See, e.g., Portland Golf Club v. Commissioner, 497 U.S. 154, 164 n.15 (1990)
("Even before the enactment of § 183, . . . the courts and the Commissioner had not
required that revenues earned in activities showing a net loss be declared as taxable
income."). See also Miller, supra note 4, at 111-13 and cases cited therein (explaining
that § 183 reflects the IRS's continued allowance of zeroing out by the taxpayer engaged
in a not-for-profit activity).
37. See H.R. REP. No. 413 (Part 1), 91st Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1,at 71 (1969),
reprinted in 1969 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1645, 1717; S. REP. No. 552, 91st Cong., 1st Sess.
102 (1969), reprinted in 1969 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2027, 2133.
38. S. REP. No. 552, supra note 37, at 104, reprinted in 1969 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2134
(emphasis added); see also H.R. REP. No. 413, supra note 37, at 71, reprinted in 1969
U.S.C.C.A.N. 1717-18.
39. See I.R.C. § 183.
40. The absence of the word "primary" in § 183 is particularly conspicuous in light of
the numerous references to "primary" in other sections of the Code. See, e.g., I.R.C. §
144(a)(8)(A) (1995) (providing that "more than 25% of the net proceeds of the issue are
to be used to provide a facility the primary purpose of which is one of the following")
(emphasis added); I.R.C. § 281(d)(l)(B) (1995) ("the primary business of which is the
providing of railroad terminal and switching facilities") (emphasis added); I.R.C.
§ 502(a) (1995) ("[a]n organization operated for the primary purpose of carrying on a
trade or business") (emphasis added); I.R.C. § 274(e)(4) (1995) ("[e]xpenses for
recreational, social, or similar activities (including facilities therefore) primarily for the
benefit of employees") (emphasis added); I.R.C. § 593(d)(1)(B) (1995) ("any loan,

500

Loyola University Chicago Law Journal

[Vol. 27

C. Treasury Regulations Under Section 183
The regulations under section 183 reflect the factors considered by
courts prior to the enactment of section 183 in making their determination of whether a taxpayer entered into or engaged in an activity with
a profit objective.' The factors include:
(1) [the] manner in which the taxpayer carries on the activity;
(2) [t]he expertise of the taxpayer or his advisors; (3) [t]he time
and effort expended by the taxpayer in carrying on the activity;
(4) [the] [e]xpectation that assets used in [the] activity may
appreciate in value; . . . (5) [t]he success of the taxpayer in
carrying on other similar or dissimilar activities; . . . (6) [t]he
taxpayer's history of income or losses with respect to the
activity; (7) the amount of occasional profits, if any, which are
earned; . . . (8) [t]he financial status of the taxpayer; . . . [and]
(9) [the] [e]lements of personal pleasure or recreation.
whether or not evidenced by a security . . . the primary obligor on which is-(i) a
government or political subdivision or instrumentality thereof') (emphasis added);
1.R.C. § 643(f) (1995) ("[Two] or more trusts shall be treated as I trust if... such trusts
have substantially the same grantor or grantors and substantially the same primary
beneficiary or beneficiaries . . . .") (emphasis added); I.R.C. § 704(e)(3) (1995) ("The
'family' of any individual shall include only his spouse, ancestors, and lineal
descendants, and any trusts for the primary benefit of such persons.") (emphasis added);
see also John A. McGuire, Tax Shelters, 13 J. REAL EST. TAX'N 362, 368 n.32 (1986)
(emphasizing that "primarily" was typically inserted by Congress expressly where it
intended "primarily" to apply and thus not applicable to § 183); John H. Young, The
Role of Motive in Evaluating Tax Sheltered Investments, 22 TAx LAw. 275, 276 (1969)
("Today of course the Internal Revenue Code is replete with references to 'the purpose',
'the principle purpose', 'one of its principle purposes', ... and so forth, all relating to
tax motivation.") (footnotes omitted).
41. Compare Treas. Reg. § 1.183-2(b) (1995) (listing relevant factors in determining whether activities are entered into or engaged in for profit) with Schley v. Commissioner, 375 F.2d 747, 750 (2d Cir. 1967) (factors considered by courts include a taxpayer's personal enjoyment of farming, a substantial independent source of income, and
the magnitude of losses over a period of years); see also Teitelbaum v. Commissioner,
346 F.2d 266, 269 (6th Cir. 1955) (taxpayer did not keep records of income or
expenses); White v. Commissioner, 227 F.2d 779, 780 (6th Cir. 1955) (taxpayer
claimed substantial losses during a 17-year period; there was no reasonable probability
that a profit would ever be generated); Helvering v. Highland, 124 F.2d 556, 561 (4th
Cir. 1942) (taxpayer's conduct not business-like; no separate office maintained in connection with activity); Vanderbilt v. Commissioner, 16 T.C.M. (CCH) 1081, 1085
(1957) (factors considered include: taxpayer's independent sources of income; losses
over a number of years; attention or inattention to business details such as recordkeeping; and hobby qualities of activity).
42. Treas. Reg. § 1.183-2(b) (1995). The regulations provide a safe harbor provision which deems an activity to be "for profit" where a profit is generated over a
specified period of years. For activities not involving breeding or showing horses, an
activity that generates a profit for at least two years in a five consecutive year period
will automatically be considered to be "for profit." Treas. Reg. § 1.183-1(c)(ii) (1994).
As breeding or showing horses is an activity that generally takes a longer period'to
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The regulations provide several examples of activities that will or
will not be considered "for profit." All of the examples except one
relate to hobby-type activities. The only non-hobby example involves
a typical tax shelter activity, wildcat oil drilling, and is derived directly
from the legislative history of section 183. 43 This example, however,
focuses on the likelihood that profits will be generated by the activity
and does not take into account the tax benefits to be generated by the
activity. 44
As acknowledged by the courts, the case law developing the profit
objective test and the regulations incorporating the factors considered
by the courts in developing such a test do not, on their face, apply to
activities outside the hobby context. Instead, the factors under the
regulations focus on the distinction between a hobby and a business
activity. 46 Thus, the factors are not easily adapted to a business context where the business versus personal distinction expense is not an
issue. Like section 183, the regulations do not impose any additional
requirements for the deductibility of business expenses, nor do they
indicate that the profit objective test under section 162 requires a
showing that the objective to earn a profit was the taxpayer's primary
or main objective.47
generate a profit, such an activity will be deemed to be for profit if it generates a profit
for two years in a seven consecutive year period. Treas. Reg. § 1.183-I (c)(i) (1994).
43. The pertinent example in the regulations reads as follows:
Example (5). A, an independent oil and gas operator, frequently engages in
the activity of searching for oil on undeveloped and unexplored land which is
not near proven fields. He does so in a manner substantially similar to that of
others who engage in the same activity. The chances, based on the experience
of A and others who engaged in this activity, are strong that A will not find a
commercially profitable oil deposit when he drills on land not established
geologically to be proven oil bearing land. However, on the rare occasions
that these activities do result in discovering a well, the operator generally
realizes a very large return from such activity. Thus, there is a small chance
that A will make a large profit from his oil exploration activity. Under these
circumstances, A is engaged in the activity of oil drilling for profit.
Treas. Reg. § 1.183-2(c) (Example 5) (1995).
44. See Treas. Reg. § 1.183-2 (1994).
45. See, e.g., Estate of Baron v. Commissioner, 83 T.C. 542, 554 (1984), aff'd, 798
F.2d 65 (2d Cir. 1986) (indicating that factors set forth in Treasury Regulations under §
183 are not easily adapted to the tax shelter context).
46. Treas. Reg. § 1.183-2(b) (1994).
47. See Samuel Franklin Painter, Comment, Art Investment Expense Deduction and
the Primary Purpose Requirement, 28 WASH. & LEEL. REV. 230, 238 (1971) (noting that
no "primary" profit objective requirement exists under the regulations).
Given that § 183 does not apply unless an activity is not a trade or business under §
162 (or is not for profit under § 212), at least one court has noted that the § 183
regulations should have been promulgated under § 162 or § 212. See Brannen v.
Commissioner, 78 T.C. 471, 507 (1982), aff'd, 722 F.2d 695 (11 th Cir. 1984).
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III. JUDICIAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE PRIMARY
PROFIT OBJECTIVE TEST

The primary test aPjsarently originated in dicta in Helvering v.
National Grocery Co., ' a Supreme Court opinion rendered prior to
the enactment of section 183. 4 9 In that case, the taxpayer/corporation
argued that the IRS had imposed an unconstitutional fifty percent tax
on its accumulated income.50 It claimed that the statute was unconstitutional because the imposition of the tax depended upon the taxpayer's state of mind.5'
In addressing the taxpayer's argument, the Supreme Court observed, in a footnote, that there are many instances where intent factors
into a determination of income tax liability.52 The Supreme Court
referred to the primary test and stated that: "the deductibility of losses
under [section 165(c)(1)-losses incurred in connection with a trade or
business activity] may depend upon whether the taxpayer's motive in
entering into the transaction was primarily profit. 53 Despite the fact
that the Supreme Court did not explicitly address the issue of the
primary profit objective test in National Grocery, a number of courts
subsequently cited the opinion for the proposition that a taxpayer must
establish a primary profit objective in order to obtain deductions under
section 162, among other Code sections.'
48. 304 U.S. 282, 289 n.5, reh'g denied, 305 U.S. 669 (1938).
49. Congress enacted § 183 of the Code in 1969. See supra notes 31-32 and
accompanying text.
50. National Grocery, 304 U.S. at 286.
51. Id. at 289. In essence, the statute required the court to determine whether the
taxpayer had accumulated the income to avoid the surtax on distributions to
shareholders. Id.
52. Id. at 289 n.5.
53. Id.
54. See, e.g., Friedman v. Commissioner, 869 F.2d 785, 790 (4th Cir. 1989)
(determining tax liability by a "primarily for profit" standard); Landreth v.
Commissioner, 859 F.2d 643, 645 (9th Cir. 1988) ("Congress intended the subjective
'primarily for profit standard"'); Knetsch v. United States, 348 F.2d 932, 936 (Ct. Cl.
1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 957 (1966) ("determinative question is whether . . .
primarily for profit"); Lamont v. Commissioner, 339 F.2d 377, 380 n.4 (2d Cir. 1964)
("profit as being the basic and dominant motive"); Austin v. Commissioner, 298 F.2d
583, 584 (2d Cir. 1962) ("in determining the deductibility of a loss, the primary motive
must be ascertained"); Fox v. Commissioner, 190 F.2d 101, 104 (2d Cir. 1951) ("hope
of monetary gain . . . is what is controlling"); Feine v. McGowan, 188 F.2d 738, 740
(2d Cir. 1951) ("'whether the taxpayer's motive in entering into the transaction was
primarily [for] profit"') (quoting National Grocery, 304 U.S. at 289 n.5); Early v.
Atkinson, 175 F.2d 118, 122 (4th Cir. 1949) ("state of mind determines the
deductibility"); Weir v. Commissioner, 109 F.2d 996, 998 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 310
U.S. 637 (1940) ("intent is frequently material to tax questions"); Estate of McGlothlin
v. Commissioner, 44 T.C. 611, 621 (1965), aff'd, 370 F.2d 729 (5th Cir. 1967) ("not
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A. Lower Court and Appellate Court Opinions
In evaluating whether a taxpayer engaged in an activity for profit,
most courts apply the actual and honest test." This test focuses on
whether or not the taxpayer had a profit objective in entering into or
engaging in an activity and does not seek to ascertain the amount or
degree of the taxpayer's profit objective. In making this threshold
determination, courts generally consider the factors listed under the
section 183 regulations.5 6 While some of the factors enumerated require consideration of the taxpayer's motivations for entering into or
carrying on an activity, courts applying the actual and honest test
generally do not compare a taxpayer's various objectives (i.e., hobby
versus profit) to determine whether an activity was for profit.57 In
allowed unless taxpayer personally expected to profit") (emphasis in original); Arata v.
Commissioner, 31 T.C. 346, 353 (1958), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 277 F.2d 576
(2d Cir. 1960) ("necessary that the 'taxpayers' motive in entering into the transaction
was primarily [for] profit") (quoting National Grocery, 304 U.S. at 289 n.5).
55. See, e.g., Smith v. Commissioner, 937 F.2d 1089, 1093 (6th Cir. 1991)
(explaining that "[u]nder § 183, an activity is engaged in for profit if the taxpayer
entertained an actual and honest . .. profit objective by engaging in the activity.");
Evans v. Commissioner, 908 F.2d 369, 373 (8th Cir.) ("actual and honest" and "bona
fide"), on remand, 61 T.C.M. (CCH) 2917 (1990), modified, 62 T.C.M. (CCH)614
(1991); Burger v. Commissioner, 809 F.2d 355, 358 (7th Cir. 1987) ("good faith
expectation of profit"); Cornfeld v. Commissioner, 797 F.2d 1049, 1051 (D.C. Cir.
1986) ("actual and honest"); Faulconer v. Commissioner, 748 F.2d 890, 895 n.10 (4th
Cir. 1984) (explaining that the activity must be engaged in for "'the purpose of making
a profit'"; "nothing in section 183 or its legislative history ... requir[es] this purpose
to be predominant") (citation omitted); Estate of Power v. Commissioner, 736 F.2d 826,
829 (1st Cir. 1984) ("facts and circumstances must indicate that the taxpayer ... [had
the] objective of making a profit") (quoting Treas. Reg. § 1.183-2(a) (1994)); Schley v.
Commissioner, 375 F.2d 747, 749 (2d Cir. 1967) (taxpayer must be motivated by "a
desire for profit"); Marine v. Commissioner, 92 T.C. 958, 988 (1989), aff'd, 921 F.2d
280 (9th Cir.) ("'actual and honest"') (citation omitted), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 819
(1991); McCrary v. Commissioner, 92 T.C. 827 (1989) ("actual and honest"); Levy v.
Commissioner, 91 T.C. 838, 871 (1988) ("actual and honest"); Rybak v. Commissioner, 91 T.C. 524, 568 (1988) ("a profit objective"); Ferrell v. Commissioner, 90
T.C. 1154, 1182 (1988) ("a profit objective"); Drobny v. Commissioner, 86 T.C. 1326,
1340 (1986) ("'actual and honest"'); Feldman v. Commissioner, 65 T.C.M. (CCH) 1747
(1993) ("actual and honest") (quoting Hirsch v. Commissioner, 315 F.2d 731, 736 (9th
Cir. 1963)), aff'd, 20 F.3d 1128 (11th Cir. 1994); Dunwoody v. Commissioner, 64
T.C.M. (CCH) 1556, 1561 (1992) ("actual and honest"); Moody v. Commissioner, 62
T.C.M. (CCH) 1357, 1360 (1991) ("'actual and honest"') (quoting Dreker v.
Commissioner, 78 T.C. 642, 644-45 (1982), aff'd, 702 F.2d 1205 (D.C. Cir. 1983));
Schillinger v. Commissioner, 60 T.C.M. (CCH) 1470, 1477 (1990), aff'd, I F.3d 954
(9th Cir. 1993) ("'actual and honest"') (quoting Dreker, 78 T.C. at 644-45); Adler v.
Commissioner, 58 T.C.M. (CCH) 594, 597 (1989) ("actual and honest"); Bass v.
Commissioner, 55 T.C.M. (CCH) 126, 130 (1988) ("actual and honest").
56. See supra note 42 and accompanying text for a list of these factors.
57. See supra note 55 (citing cases in which the court applied the actual and honest
test).
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part, because the courts need not make such a comparison under the
actual and honest test, little debate has arisen over the viability of this
test.
Some courts, however, apply the stricter primary test, which asks
whether the objective to earn a profit was of "first importance" to the
taxpayer.58 Thus, unlike the actual and honest test, it appears that a
court must compare a taxpayer's various objectives for entering into or
carrying on the activity in question when applying the primary test.
Since National Grocery,courts have applied the primary test in both
the hobby context and the business context.5 9 As discussed above, the
hobby context involves the business versus personal distinction.60
However, in the business context, the two taxpayer objectives that are
generally at issue are the objective to earn a profit and the objective to
obtain tax benefits.6'
Application of the primary test in the business context became
particularly noticeable during the 1980s with the proliferation of tax
shelters.62 Tax shelter cases reviewed by courts during this period
generally involved similar factual patterns, including, for example,
highly leveraged investments and large deductions in relation to the
amount of cash actually invested.63 In an attempt to disallow excessive
58. See, e.g., Landreth, 859 F.2d at 645 ("'primarily for profit"') (quoting National
Grocery, 304 U.S. at 289 n.5); Lamont, 339 F.2d at 380 n.4 ("basic, dominant and
primary"); Early, 175 F.2d at 122 ("purpose to derive a gain must be the chief or primary
one"); McGlothlin, 44 T.C. at 621 ("prime" motive); Wayno v. Commissioner, 63
T.C.M. (CCH) 1935, 1940 (1992), aff'd, 12 F.3d 1111 (9th Cir. 1993) ("'primary"')
(citation omitted), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1174 (1995). See also supra notes 48-54
(tracing the development of the primary profit objective test).
59. See, e.g., Agro Science Co. v. Commissioner, 934 F.2d 573, 576 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 502 U.S. 907 (1991) (determination of profit motive of partnership); Simon v.
Commissioner, 830 F.2d 499, 500 (3d Cir. 1987) (predominant purpose of limited
partnership); Brannen v. Commissioner, 722 F.2d 695, 704 (11th Cir. 1984)
("concluded that the profit test should be applied on the partnership level"); Nickerson
v. Commissioner, 700 F.2d 402, 404 (7th Cir. 1983) (applying test for purpose of
renovation of farm); Fox v. Commissioner, 82 T.C. 1001, 1022 (1984) ("determine
which of petitioner's two motives was primary"); Surloff v. Commissioner, 81 T.C.
210, 233 (1983) ("burden . . . to show that the partnerships were engaged in the coal
business with the dominant objective of realizing a profit").
60. See supra note 4 and accompanying text (discussing application of the profit
objective test in the hobby context).
61. See infra notes 75-99 and accompanying text (discussing opinions in the
business context which have compared various taxpayer objectives).
62. See Ivan H. Humphreys, Tax Shelters: Establishing Profit Motive in Tax
Shelters, 3 J. TAX'N INVESTMENTs 250 (1986) (discussing the application of § 183 to
tax shelters in the Tax Court).
63. To better understand the context outside of the hobby area in which courts have
utilized the primary test, consider the following example: Taxpayer A invests in a wind
turbine which ostensibly will generate an energy source that the taxpayer can offer for
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deductions from activities perceived to be abusive, courts increasingly
6
applied the profit objective test and the underlying primary test.
As illustrated by the multitude of cases decided during this period,
no single, uniform standard exists for applying the primary test.65
This lack of uniformity can be attributed in part to the varying language
and standards used by the courts to identify and apply the primary
test.' Additionally, the courts' failure to explicitly indicate the method

sale. Taxpayer A's investment is represented by a $5,000 cash down payment and a
$115,000 long-term debt obligation. The long-term debt obligation is secured only by
Taxpayer A's interest in the wind turbine. Taxpayer A claims depreciation deductions
and investment tax credits based on the full $120,000 purchase price. Taxpayer A never
makes any payments on the long-term debt obligation.
The example set forth above is based on an actual case decided by the Tax Court. See
Baxter v. Commissioner, 50 T.C.M. (CCH) 545 (1985), affid in part and rev'd in part,
816 F.2d 493 (9th Cir. 1987). In its opinion in which it determined that the taxpayer
lacked a primary profit objective, the Tax Court applied the factors under the § 183
regulations and determined that the taxpayer was primarily motivated by the desire to
obtain tax benefits. Id. at 547-49. The Tax Court did not, however, set forth any
rationale for requiring a primary profit objective, nor did it explain how it determined
that the taxpayer's objective to earn a profit was less important than his objective to
obtain tax benefits. See id.
Instead of using the profit objective analysis to disallow business deductions, the
court could have determined the value of the wind turbine and held that because the debt
was not supported by value, the taxpayer could only deduct interest on the portion of the
debt representing the true value of the wind turbine. See infra notes 133-38 and
accompanying text (discussing the difficulty of applying the primary test to transaction
and investment decisions).
64. See infra notes 111-32.
65. See infra notes 66-90 and accompanying text.
66. Judge Swift of the United States Tax Court discussed the proposition that the
primary test has not been developed uniformly by the courts in his concurring opinion
in Peat Oil & Gas Assocs. v. Commissioner, 100 T.C. 271 (1993), aff'd sub noin
Ferguson v. Commissioner, 29 F.3d 98 (2d Cir. 1994). Judge Swift noted:
[T]he courts have not been consistent in the language used to describe the
quantity or level of profit objective that must be established . . . . [T]he
inconsistent profit-objective language that has been used has included, among
other language, the following: "Basic", "dominant", "primary", "predominant", "substantial", "reasonable", "bona fide", and "actual and honest". As
one court commented, we have been "glutted with tests. Many such tests
proliferate because they give the comforting illusion of consistency and
precision. They often obscure rather than clarify."
Id. at 280 (Swift, J., concurring) (citation omitted).
For a further discussion of the lack of uniform language used by courts to describe the
primary test, see Rose v. Commissioner, 88 T.C. 386, 411-14 (1987) (discussing different words used to describe the profit objective test), affid, 868 F.2d 851 (6th Cir. 1989);
Johnson v. United States, 11 Cl. Ct. 17, 26-28 (1986) (discussing various profit
objective tests applied in the tax shelter context by the Tax Court); Packard v. Commissioner, 85 T.C. 397, 418 (1985) (noting that courts have not clarified the quantity or
degree of profit objective necessary for a transaction to be recognized for tax purposes).

506

Loyola University Chicago Law Journal

[Vol. 27

used to compare a taxpayer's various objectives exacerbates the confusion surrounding the primary test.'
A few examples of the different language used by the courts to describe the stricter test of profit objective include "primary," "principal,"
"predominant," "overriding," and "substantial. 68 Some courts have
even used different language within the same opinion to describe the
requisite profit objective.
For instance, in its opinion in Polakof v. Commissioner,69 the
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit first indicated that
"[p]etitioners must be engaged in a trade or business with an actual
profit objective. ' 70 Two paragraphs later, the court stated that the taxpayers in that case were required to show a "dominant profit objective.'7 Likewise, in Nickeson v. Commissioner,72 the United States
67. See, e.g., Antonides v. Commissioner, 893 F.2d 656, 659 (4th Cir. 1990)
("ITlhe determination of whether an activity is engaged in for profit must involve
consideration of all relevant facts and circumstances."); Imbesi v. Commissioner, 361
F.2d 640, 644-45 (3d Cir. 1966) (stating that the primary intent or motive of the
taxpayer is not usually at issue "because the usual enterprise is surrounded by the
conventional characteristics of a business or profession"; as such, a predominant profit
motive is simply taken for granted); Engdahl v. Commissioner, 72 T.C. 659, 666
(1979) (stating only that "[g]reater weight is to be given to objective facts than to
petitioners' mere statement of their intent" before beginning its analysis), acq. 1979-2
C.B. 1; Monfore v. United States, 214 Ct. Cl. 705, 722-25 (1977) (explaining that the
existence of a profit motive is determined by weighing various factors including: the
consistency between the taxpayer's subjective intent and other objective evidence; the
taxpayer's actual success in making a profit, the taxpayer's acquisition of his enterprise;
evidence of business-like management by the taxpayer; and the maintenance of records
by the taxpayer); Seebold v. Commissioner, 55 T.C.M. (CCH) 723, 726-27 (1988)
(reviewing briefly the factors listed in Treas. Reg. 1.183-2(b)); Harvey v. Commissioner, 54 T.C.M. (CCH) 1508, 1511 (1988) (concluding, with little explanation, that
the taxpayers evidenced the requisite profit motive); see also Allan J. Samansky, Hobby
Loss or Deductible Loss: An Intractable Problem, 34 U. FLA. L. REV. 46, 55-59 (1981)
(stating that because of the uncertainty surrounding the definition, "[tihe primary
purpose test is unsatisfactory").
68. See supra notes 58, 66, and accompanying text.
69. 820 F.2d 321, 323 n.l (9th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1025 (1988).
70. Id. (emphasis added).
71. Id. at 323 (emphasis added). In response to the taxpayer's argument that the Tax
Court had improperly required a principal or primary profit objective, as opposed to a
basic objective, the court rejected any distinction between the two tests. Id. at 323 n.2.
This contrasts with the views of other courts, which have recognized a distinction
between requiring a "principal" profit objective and requiring an "actual and honest"
profit objective. See, e.g., Simon v. Commissioner, 830 F.2d 499, 500 (1987) (giving
different definitions of the words "primary" and "profit": "'[p]rimary' . . . means 'of
first importance' or 'principally,' while 'profit' means economic profit independent of
tax savings") (citations omitted); Peat Oil & Gas Assocs., 100 T.C. at 289 (Ruwe, J.,
concurring) (explaining that "[t]he distinction between finding that the taxpayers had a
profit objective and finding that profit was their primary objective cannot be dismissed
as mere semantics"); Fox v. Commissioner, 82 T.C. 1001, 1022 (1984) (explaining
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Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit initially stated that the appropriate test for profit objective is whether the taxpayer engaged in the
activity "in good faith, with the dominant hope and intent of realizing a
profit.",7' However, on the same page the court noted that "the Tax
Court made the determination crucial to the instant case-whether the
taxpayers had an actual and honest profit objective.""4
One court has even used different language within the same paragraph to describe the primary test. In Nickerson v. Commissioner,7
the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit stated:
Petitioners bear the burden of proving that their primary
purpose . . . was to make a profit.

In meeting this burden,

however, "it is sufficient if the taxpayer has a bona fide
expectation of realizing a,7profit, regardless of the reasonableness of such expectation.
The actual method of applying the primary test-although difficult
in many cases to ascertain precisely-has also been inconsistent.
Many of the courts that have seemingly adopted the primary test have
applied it in the same manner as the actual and honest test (i.e., such
courts apply the factors under Code section 183) without comparing
profit versus other objectives.77
that "primary" and "profit motive" mean different things in a § 162(c)(2) analysis);
Surloff v. Commissioner, 81 T.C. 210, 233 (1983) (detailing the different meanings of
"primary" and "profit").
72. 962 F.2d 973, 976 (10th Cir. 1992).
73. Id. (citations omitted).
74. Id.
75. 700 F.2d 402 (7th Cir. 1983). In Nickerson, the taxpayer purchased a farm and
worked there on weekends. Id. at 403. The Tax Court found that the taxpayer lacked a
profit objective, concluding, among other things, that the activity was merely a hobby
that the taxpayer engaged in for pleasure. Id. The Seventh Circuit reversed the Tax
Court's holding, noting that the fact that the taxpayer entered into the activity because
of "fond memories of youth" did not preclude a finding that the taxpayer had a profit
objective. Id. at 407.
76. Id. at 404 (citations omitted).
77. See, e.g., Nickeson, 962 F.2d at 976 ("whether the taxpayers had an actual and
honest profit objective"); Bryant v. Commissioner, 928 F.2d 745, 750 (6th Cir. 1991)
("the court should determine from the facts and circumstances surrounding the
investment whether the taxpayer entered the activity with the objective of making a
profit"); Surloff, 81 T.C. at 209 ("whether [the transaction] had any economic
substance"); Christensen v. Commissioner, 56 T.C.M. (CCH) 425, 430 (1988) ("had an
,actual and honest objective of making a profit"') (quoting Dreicer v. Commissioner, 78
T.C. 642, 645 (1982)); Seebold v. Commissioner, 55 T.C.M. (CCH) 723, 726 (1988)
(reviewing the factors listed in Treasury Regulation 1.183-2(b)); Harvey v.
Commissioner, 54 T.C.M. (CCH) 1508, 1511 (1988) (analyzing the relevant factors
used to determine whether a taxpayer entered into an activity with a profit motive). For a
discussion of cases where the courts have engaged in a comparison of objectives, see
infra notes 87-101 and accompanying text.
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For example, in Thomas v. Commissioner,78 the taxpayer invested
79
in a coal mining venture promoted as a "tax-sheltered investment.
The promotional materials given to investors focused on the potential
tax benefits and indicated that the risks of loss associated with the
investment were significant, but were vague about the amount of profit
the investment was expected to yield.80 The purchase price of the
taxpayer's investment consisted of a cash down payment and a nonrecourse note in an amount that was approximately twice the cash
down payment.8 Investors in the mining operation sustained losses in
the first three years of operation and reported a small profit in the
fourth year, 2 at which time operations were completely shut down
because of various safety concerns and difficulties with contractors.83
The Thomas court determined that the mining venture was not "run
in a businesslike fashion," the "anticipated economic projections were
not met by the [mining operation]," and "there was virtually no meaningful investigation into the marketability of the coal."8 4 The court
acknowledged that the taxpayer could have had at least a "subsidiary"
intent to earn a profit;8 5 however, it summarily concluded without further analysis that "the primary objective of the... [mining operation]
86
was to secure tax benefits rather than to earn an economic profit."
In opinions in which courts have indicated that they compared the
taxpayer's various objectives, the method of comparison used is generally not explicitly set forth in the opinion. In Fox v. Commissioner,8 7 the taxpayer invested in speculative hedging transactions that involved the purchase and/or sale of offsetting options on United States
Treasury bills.88 The taxpayer reported large losses in connection with
the transactions, which the IRS disallowed on the grounds that the
transactions89 had not been "entered into primarily for profit.''9°
In determining whether the taxpayer entered into the transactions
pursuant to a primary profit objective, the Tax Court assumed, without
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.

84 T.C. 1244 (1985), aff'd, 792 F.2d 1256 (4th Cir. 1986).
Id. at 1252-53.
Id. at 1251-52, 1272-73.
Id. at 1256.
Id. at 1267.
Id. at 1263.
Id. at 1276-78.
Id. at 1272-73.
Id. at 1279-80.

87.

82 T.C. 1001 (1984).

88. Id. at 1002.
89. Id. at 1004-05, 1014-16.
90. Id. at 1019.
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explanation, that the taxpayer had at least "some" profit objective. 9'
However, without any analysis whatsoever, the court stated: "We
conclude without great difficulty that petitioner was motivated
primarily by tax considerations, and not primarily by the desire for
economic profit ....92
In Estate of Baron v. Commissioner,93 the Tax Court made a dollarfor-dollar comparison of the tax benefits and the before-tax profit.94
Its decision appears to be the only opinion in which a court has
explicitly set forth its method of comparison.95 In Estate of Baron, the
taxpayer purchased the rights to a copy of a soundtrack to a major
motion picture. 96 The purchase price reflected a cash payment equaling approximately one-sixth of the purchase price and a non-recourse
note representing the remainder of the purchase price.97 The taxpayer
knew little about the movie and soundtrack business and appeared to
be focused on the potential tax98 benefits, and the taxpayer, in fact, received a four to one write-off.
In determining that the taxpayer was not entitled to deduct expenses
paid in connection with his investment, the Tax Court concluded that
the taxpayer lacked the requisite profit objective:
[T]he presence of a potential $70,000 profit on [the taxpayer's]
cash investment is not sufficient to cause us to conclude that [the
taxpayer] had a profit objective aside from the net tax99 benefits
of $365,000 which he anticipated being able to obtain.
The Tax Court in Estate of Baron did not cite any authority for its
determination that $70,000 was insufficient to support a finding that
the taxpayer engaged in the activity in question for profit.'0
91. Id.
92. Id. at 1023. Itis unclear from the opinion what result the court would have
reached if it had considered whether the taxpayer acted pursuant to "any" profit
objective.
93. 83 T.C. 542 (1984), aff'd, 798 F.2d 65 (2d Cir. 1986).
94. Id. at 556.
95. Id. at 558-59.
96. Id. at 543.
97. Id. The Tax Court first determined that the taxpayer was not entitled to depreciation deductions based on the value of the nonrecourse note because the note was "too
contingent" to be considered valid debt. Id. at 549.
98. Id. at 554-56.
99. Id. at 559.
100. Estate of Baron exemplifies the confusion that has arisen in the courts' attempts
to formulate an appropriate test for profit objective in the business context. See id. at
558-59 (explaining that the test they are announcing may be "less-than-precise"). In
addition to applying a dollar-for-dollar comparison of the taxpayer's objectives, the
court inconsistently described the profit objective test as requiring both a "bona fide"
profit objective, and in rejecting the requirement of a "primary" or "dominant" profit
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In addition to using an arbitrary method to compare the taxpayer's
various objectives, the Estate of Baron opinion further muddied the
waters in the profit objective area by introducing an entirely new test
for profit objective:
We conclude that an intermediate position will usually be in
order, namely, that the disparity between before-tax profit and
tax benefits be weighed in the context of all the factors involved
in determining the existence of the requisite profit objective,
rather than applying a "primary or dominant" test for nontax
factors....
Despite advancing this new test, no authority explicitly addresses the
"intermediate" test of Estate of Baron, and it does not appear that this
test has subsequently been applied by the Tax Court.
B. Criticism of the Primary Test
The adoption and application of the primary test has not gone unnoticed by other courts, some of which have rejected the primary test
as unsupported by the statutory language and the legislative history of
section 183 as well as by the regulations under section 183.102 For
example, in Faulconerv. Commissioner,10 3 the United States Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit considered whether a taxpayer engaged
objective, adopting some unspecified "intermediate" profit objective where "all the
factors involved in determining the existence of the requisite profit objective" would be
weighed. Id. at 558.
101. Id. at 558 (footnote omitted).
102. See, e.g., Faulconer v. Commissioner, 748 F.2d 890, 895-96 n. 10 (4th Cir.
1984) (noting that neither the statutory language nor the legislative history requires
that the primary purpose test be predominant); Lamont v. Commissioner, 339 F.2d 377,
380 (2d Cir. 1964) (stating that in analyzing profit, the question is whether the
activities are "carried on in good faith," thus rejecting the primary purpose test); Peat
Oil & Gas Assocs. v. Commissioner, 100 T.C. 271, 280 (1993) (Swift, J., concurring)
(stating that the "primary" profit objective test is not grounded in any statutory or
regulatory language, is "contrary to commercial and financial reality," and is a rule
which only applies to an activity undertaken as a hobby), aff'd, 29 F.3d 98 (2d Cir.
1994); Sheldon v. Commissioner, 94 T.C. 738, 771-72 (1990) (Wells, J., dissenting)
(citing Estate of Baron, 83 T.C. at 558 for support in adopting the "actual and honest
profit objective for § 183 purposes"); Levy v. Commissioner, 91 T.C. 838, 871 (1988)
(stating that the profit-objective test is satisfied by "an actual and honest profit
objective"); Johnson v. United States, 11 Cl. Ct. 17, 27 (1986) (stating that the
"primary" requirement should be limited to the "hobby loss" situation); McGuire, supra
note 40 (discussing the Tax Court's incorrect insertion of the primary test into § 183
without the proper statutory support); William L. Raby, Tax Shelters: How Much Profit
Potential Is Enough?, 60 TAX NOTES 327, 327-30 (1993) (comparing the divergent
opinions in Peat Oil & Gas Assocs. between the primary objective test and the actual and
honest profit objective test in the court's concurring opinions); Samansky, supra note
67, at 59 (stating that "the primary purpose test is unsatisfactory").
103. 748 F.2d 890 (4th Cir. 1984).
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in a horse and cattle breeding activity for profit. In holding that the
taxpayer conducted the activity "for profit," the Court noted:
We find nothing in section 183 or its legislative history ...
requiring [the profit objective] ...to be predominant. Section
183 requires simply that an activity be "engaged in for profit."
The Senate report indicates only that under section 183 a
taxpayer must have entered or0 4continued an activity with "the
objective of making a profit."'
A number of other courts have rejected the application of a primary test
in the business context only.'0 5 In Johnson v. United States, 0 6 the
United States Claims Court (now called the United States Court of
Federal Claims) criticized the application of a primary test in the business context, stating:
Other factors, however, suggest that a primary or dominant
standard is not appropriate in the business setting. Neither
section 183 nor the Treasury regulations issued under it require
a primary or dominant profit motive. . . . Economic and tax
motives regularly operate side by side to influence business
transactions, and it would be unfair and contrary to the realities
of the107marketplace to apply a "primary or dominant" test to

them.

While the Code does not impose a primary profit objective requirement in any context, the Claims Court's approach in Johnson (namely,
the application of a primary test in the hobby context only) would
appear in accord with several recent Supreme Court cases such as
Commissioner v. Groetzinger0 8 and Portland Golf Club v. Commissioner,109 that refer to the profit objective test under section 162 of the
Code. However, as indicated below, the Supreme Court has not yet
directly addressed this issue."0 Therefore, such recent opinions
should not be interpreted as conclusive authority on this issue.

104. Id. at 896 n.10 (citations omitted).
105. See Peat Oil & Gas Assocs., 100 T.C. at 283-84 (Swift, J.,concurring); Levy,
91 T.C. at 855-56; Johnson, II Cl. Ct. at 26-27; see generally McGuire, supra note 40
(rejecting primary test in the business context); Raby, supra note 102 (same).
106. 11CI. Ct. 17 (1986). In Johnson, the taxpayer purchased certain computer
equipment which he in turn leased back to the seller. Id. at 20. The purchase price of the
computer equipment was reflected by a $55,000 recourse note and a $310,000
nonrecourse note. Id. at 23.
107. Id. at 26, 27 (citations omitted).

108. 480 U.S. 23, 23 (1987).
109. 497 U.S. 154, 164 (1990).
110. See infra part IlI.C.
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C. Supreme Court Cases Discussing Profit Objective
In 1987, the Supreme Court in Groetzinger,"' for the first time
since its opinion in NationalGrocery,"2 mentioned specifically the primary profit objective test under section 162."3 In Groetzinger, the
Supreme Court considered whether a taxpayer could deduct losses incurred in gambling in excess of the taxpayer's gambling winnings.14
In holding that the taxpayer was in the trade or business of gambling,
and, therefore, that his losses were deductible, the Supreme Court
noted:
We accept the fact that to be engaged in a trade or business, the
taxpayer must be involved in the activity with continuity and
regularity and that the taxpayer's primary purpose for engaging
in the activity must be for income or for profit. A sporadic
activity, a hobby, or an amusement diversion does not
qualify."'
In using the word "primary" in Groetzinger,the Supreme Court apparently invoked the traditional dichotomy in the Code between business activities (for which deductions under Code sections 162 and 212
are available) and personal activities (for which deductions under Code
section 162 are not available)." 16 The subject matter of Groetzingergambling, an activity generally thought to be one that is engaged in for
recreational purposes-suggests that the Supreme Court might construe the primary test as applying only in cases in which the issue
involves the business/personal distinction.
In another recent opinion, Portland Golf Club,' 7 the Supreme
Court discussed the primary profit objective requirement in the context
of a nonprofit organization that attempted to deduct expenses relating
to nonexempt income, i.e., income not related to the organization's
exempt purpose, from its exempt investment income. Although the
Supreme Court quoted the language from Groetzinger referring to a
primary profit objective, the Court further stated that:
The Code's limitation on deductibility ... reflects the view that
taxpayers should not be allowed to deduct what are, in essence,
I 11. 480 U.S. 23 (1987).
112. 304 U.S. 282 (1938). See supra notes 48-54 and accompanying text
(discussing National Grocery Co.).
113. Groetzinger, 480 U.S. at 23.
114. Id. at 24-25.
I 15. Id. at 35 (emphasis added).
116. See supra notes 2-4 and accompanying text (discussing distinction in the Code
between business and personal expenses).
117. 497 U.S. 154 (1990).
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personal expenses .simpy because the activity in question
generates some receipts.

While the Supreme Court did not directly address the validity or the
applicability of the primary test as such, its opinion in PortlandGolf
Club might be read as suggesting that the Supreme Court would limit
the application of the primary test to the hobby context in its future
opinions.""
Some courts have cited the Supreme Court's "primary" language in
Groetzingeras support for a primary profit objective requirement in all
contexts, including the business context. 20 In Antonides v. Commissioner,121 the Fourth Circuit implicitly overruled its language in
Faulconerv. Commissioner,22 in which the court discussed the lack
of support for a primary test in the language of section 183 and its
accompanying regulations. The Fourth Circuit cited Groetzinger 23 as
requiring a primary profit objective (as opposed to an actual and honest
profit objective), "for deductions to be allowable under section
162."' 124 The Fourth Circuit did not,
however, limit its holding to
25
cases arising in the hobby context.
At least one judge has read Groetzingereven more expansively. In
his concurring opinion in Peat Oil & Gas Associates v. Commissioner, 26 Judge Ruwe relied in part on Groetzinger, and suggested
that the "actual and honest" and "primary," profit objective tests actually
118. Id. at 166 n.16.
119. As indicated above, however, such a limitation would not cure the inherent
problem in the application of the primary test to any context-namely, that the test
lacks a statutory basis and does not provide a workable standard. See supra notes 39-40
and accompanying text.
120. See, e.g., Antonides v. Commissioner, 893 F.2d 656, 659 (4th Cir. 1990); Peat
Oil & Gas Assocs., 100 T.C. at 289 (Ruwe, J., concurring); Clayton v. Commissioner,
65 T.C.M. (CCH) 2371, 2373 (1993); Little v. Commissioner, 65 T.C.M. (CCH) 3025,
3029 (1993); Doerries v. Commissioner, 62 T.C.M. (CCH) 484, 488 (1991); Resser v.
Commissioner, 62 T.C.M. (CCH) 617, 626 (1991); Dutton v. Commissioner, 60
T.C.M. (CCH) 606, 610 (1990); Klepetko v. Commissioner, 60 T.C.M. (CCH) 1489,
1493 (1990); Sloan v. Commissioner, 55 T.C.M. (CCH) 1238, 1240 (1988); Williams
v. Commissioner, 53 T.C.M. (CCH) 1203, 1205 (1987); see also Miller, supra note 4,
at 110 n.1l (discussing Groetzinger and courts citing to the Groetzinger Court's
"primary" language).
121. 893 F.2d 656 (4th Cir. 1990). In Antonides, the taxpayer invested in a
partnership that was formed to run a yacht-chartering business. Id. at 657. The purchase
price of the partnership interest was reflected by an $18,958 cash payment, and the
remainder of the purchase price was financed with a $75,832 full recourse loan. Id.
122. 748 F.2d 890, 895-96 n.10 (4th Cir. 1984).
123. 480 U.S. 23, 25 (1987).
124. Antonides, 893 F.2d at 659.
125. Id.
126. 100 T.C. 271, 287-88 (1993) (Ruwe, J., concurring).
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reflect a two-pronged profit objective test required under section 183
of the Code. 2 Judge Ruwe noted:
[T]he mere existence of a profit objective will not necessarily
result in the allowance of deductions. A taxpayer still must meet
the separate subjective test inherent in sections 162 and 183
requiring that the taxpayer's primary
purpose for engaging in
28
the activity was to make a profit.1
As support for his interpretation of section 183, Judge Ruwe cites to
several Circuit Court opinions that can be interpreted to suggest that
the profit objective test is a two-part test. 29 For example, in Estate of
Baron v. Commissioner,130 the United States Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit, discussing a "quantitative" profit objective, stated:
Where a bona fide expectation of economic gain exists, the
possibility of significant tax benefits will not per se preclude the
taxpayer from taking deductions for depreciation on the
investment .

. .

. Here, however, [the taxpayer] failed to

demonstrate any reasonable expectation of profit. We therefore
need not comment on the precise extent to which a transaction
must be profit-motivated for a taxpayer to be entitled to tax
benefits arising from the transaction.
However, there does not appear to be any opinion in which a court
has expressly held that there is a two-part profit objective test under
section 183. Further, as indicated above, the Code, including section
183 and the regulations thereunder, does not provide any support for
imposing a primary profit objective3 2requirement, either alone or as part
of a two-part profit objective test.

27. Id. at 289 (Ruwe, J., concurring).
128. Id. at 288 (Ruwe, J., concurring) (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
129. See, e.g., Agro Science v. Commissioner, 934 F.2d 573, 576 (5th Cir.) (holding that expenditures may only be deducted under §§ 162, 174 and 212 if the facts and
circumstances indicate that the taxpayer made them primarily in furtherance of some
bona fide profit objective independent of tax consequences), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 907
(1991); Estate of Baron v. Commissioner, 798 F.2d 65, 72-75 (2d Cir. 1986)
(discussing quantitative versus qualitative aspects of the profit objective test); see also
Sanderson v. Commissioner, 50 T.C.M. (CCH) 1033, 1040 n.15 (1985) (suggesting
that the profit objective test under Code § 183 is more stringent than the profit
objective test applied under the sham transaction doctrine); Philip P. Storrer and
Franklin Lowenthal, Use of Present Value in Determining Profit Motive, 13 REV. TAX'N
INDIVIDUALS 150, 154 n.20 (1989) (stating that a modicum of profit is sufficient to avoid
a showing of sham while something more is required to avoid a not-for-profit finding
under § 183).
130. 798 F.2d 65 (2d Cir. 1986).
13 1. Id. at 72 (emphasis in original).
132. See supra notes 37-47 and accompanying text (discussing lack of support for
the primary test in § 183 and in the regulations under § 183).
1
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IV. INCOMPATIBILITY WITH THE INDIVIDUAL
DECISION-MAKING PROCESS

The primary test is particularly problematic in that the test is wholly
incompatible with the individual decision-making process.' 33 Investors in the marketplace regularly take into account tax incentives when
structuring transactions and making investment decisions."' The primary test ignores this reality by requiring investors to discount tax
consequences that may very likely determine whether the investment
will be financially advantageous.
35
As stated by the Claims Court in Johnson v. UnitedStates: 1
133. See Peat Oil & Gas Assocs., 100 T.C. at 280 (Swift, J., concurring); Levy, 91
T.C. at 871-72. As stated by Bittker & McMahon in their treatise on individual federal
income taxation:
Taxpayers often organize corporations, establish trusts, make gifts, sell
property, and borrow money-to mention only a few obvious areas-in ways
or at times selected to reduce their tax liabilities. In many cases, the tax
savings is so clearly granted by the statute that even the most severe moralist
would direct any criticism at Congress rather than at the taxpayer. When the
Code requires taxpayers to pick one of several options to be chosen (e.g., cash
or accrual accounting, immediate expensing versus capitalization, and
depreciation of certain investments), for example, it would be quixotic of them
to gladden the heart of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue by electing the
most costly.
BORtS BIrrKER & MARTIN MCMAHON, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF INDIVIDUALS, 1.3 at
1-23 (2d ed. 1995).
134. BrrrKER & MCMAHON, supra note 133.
135. 11 Cl. Ct. 17 (1986).
An individual enters into an activity for many
complicated reasons, some of which may include a desire to earn a profit, others of
which may be personal and more significant than the desire to earn a profit. See, e.g.,
Donald C. Langevoort, Theories, Assumptions and Securities Regulation: Market
Efficiency Revisited, 140 U. Pa. L. Rev. 851, 859-61 (1992) (discussing rationality and
investor behavior). Langevoort notes in his article that investor decision-making is
influenced by a variety of internal and external factors. Id. For example, Langevoort
notes: "A second phenomenon is the tendency of people to be overconfident in their
predictive abilities. In dealing with uncertain events, they overweigh the skill element
of their decisions, and discount the element of chance . . . . Investors may therefore
systematically underestimate the levels of risk they assume." Id. at 859. See also
Donald C. Langevoort, Disclosures that "Bespeak Caution," 49 Bus. LAw 481, 503 n.43
(1994) (finding that the courts are often impatient with apparently sophisticated
investors who seem to act without due caution).
Where a taxpayer shows an intent to make a profit, assuming that the activity meets
the other tax law requirements, the taxpayer should be entitled to deduct expenses paid or
incurred in connection with the activity. No court would suggest that the actions of a
corporation's board of directors should be closely scrutinized to determine if each and.
every such action were primarily motivated by profit, as such actions often are
motivated by nonprofit considerations, such as community pressure and long-term
business considerations that are inherently inconsistent with earning a profit. See,
e.g., Dennis J. Block et al., The Business Judgment Rule in Shareholder Derivative
Litigation, PRAC. L. INST., Oct.-Nov. 1991, at 429. The authors note:
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Economic and tax motives regularly operate side by side to
influence business transactions, and it would be unfair and
contrary to the realities of the
36 marketplace to apply a "primary
or dominant" test to them.'

The Supreme Court often has recognized the close relationship between tax objectives and other business objectives in cases such as
Frank Lyon Co. v. United States. 137 In Frank Lyon, the Supreme
Court held that a taxpayer could deduct expenses paid or incurred in
connection with leasing transactions unless the taxpayer has no busiother than obtaining tax benefits in entering the transness purposes
38
action.
Also, during the same time period in which it decided National
Grocery,139 the Supreme Court recognized in other opinions that a taxpayer's desire to minimize his or her tax bill by taking advantage of
beneficial provisions in the Code is legitimate and will not result in a
denial of tax benefits as long as the transaction is not a sham.' 40 In
Gregory v. Helvering, 4' the Supreme Court explained:
The legal right of a taxpayer to decrease the amount of what
them, by
otherwise would be his taxes, or altogether to avoid
42
means which the law permits, cannot be doubted.'

Other courts have also recognized the legitimacy of taxpayers
relying on the beneficial provisions under the Code in structuring
transactions and in making 'business decisions. 43 The Tax Court
Because businessmen and women are correctly perceived as possessing skills,
information and judgment not possessed by reviewing courts and because there
is great social utility in encouraging the allocation of assets and the
evaluation and assumption of economic risk by those with such skill and
information, courts have long been reluctant to second-guess such decisions
when they appear to have been made in good faith.
Id.
136. Johnson, 11. Cl. Ct. at 27.
137. 435 U.S. 561 (1978).
138. Id. at 562.
139. 304 U.S. 282 (1938); see also supra notes 48-54 and accompanying text
(discussing National Grocery).
140. See infra note 151 (discussing sham transactions).
141. 293 U.S. 465 (1935).
142. Id. at 469 (citations omitted). See also Knetsch v. United States, 364 U.S. 361,
365 (1960) (quoting Gregory for the same proposition that a taxpayer has a right to
avoid taxes as much as the law permits).
143. See, e.g., Commissioner v. Brown, 380 U.S. 563, 579-80 (1965) (Harlan, J.,
concurring); Peat Oil & Gas Assocs. v. Commissioner, 100 T.C. 271, 276 (1993); Levy
v. Commissioner, 91 T.C. 838, 853, 871-72 (1988); Friendship Dairies, Inc. v.
Commissioner, 90 T.C. 1054, 1064 (1988); Johnson, II Cl. Ct. at 27; Estate of
Thomas v. Commissioner, 84 T.C. 412, 432 (1985).
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stated this principle in Fox v. Commissioner,'" as follows:
Tax planning is an economic reality in the business world and
the effect of tax laws on transactions is routinely considered
along with other factors. Congress has often turned this fact
into a tool by which to encourage particular conduct and
achieve certain policy goals. Numerous
provisions of the
4
Internal Revenue Code attest to this.'

Even the IRS recognizes that taxpayers regularly take tax consequences into account when planning transactions. In Revenue Procedure 75-2 1,146 the IRS set forth guidelines for the deductibility of
expenses paid or incurred in connection with equipment leasing activities. 147 The guidelines do not require a dominant or primary profit
objective, rather, the amount or degree of profit objective required
under the Service's guidelines is met if the taxpayer/lessor expects to
receive "a profit from the transaction, apart from the value of or
benefits obtained from the tax deductions, allowances, credits, and
other tax attributes arising from [the leasing] transaction."' 4
The recognition by the courts and by the IRS of the close relationship between tax and other business motivations suggests that taxpayers' deductions should not be disallowed unless taxpayers have no
profit objective, unless the transaction has no business purpose or is a
sham, or unless allowing the deductions at issue would violate some
provision in the Code other than the pr&fit objective test under section
162.
Further, a primary test may often conflict with congressional policy
to provide tax benefits for certain types of investments. As indicated
above, Congress has, on many occasions, provided tax benefits for
the very purpose of encouraging taxpayers to invest in a specific activ144. 82 T.C. 1001 (1984).
145. Id. at 1025 (citations omitted) (emphasis added). In Fox, the Tax Court
recognized that in some cases, tax benefits may be the main objective of a taxpayer
entering into a transaction, and may even be the primary reason that the taxpayer
invests in a particular investment. See id. at 1021.
Courts have recognized the principle that a taxpayer's other objectives operate sideby-side with a profit objective in the hobby context. In Jackson v. Commissioner, the
Tax Court noted that: "[A] business will not be turned into a hobby merely because the
owner finds it pleasurable; 'suffering has never been made a prerequisite to
deductibility."' 59 T.C. 312, 317 (1972), acq., 1973-2 C.B. 2 (quoting Wilson v.
Eisner, 282 F. 38, 42 (2d Cir. 1922)).
146. Reprinted in Rev. Proc. 75-21, 1975-1 C.B. 715; see also MACON &
UMBRECHT, TAX ASPECTS OF EQUIPMENT LEASING-LEVERAGED LEASING 313, 430-36 (3d
ed. 1988) (discussing how to structure equipment leases to maximize tax benefits).
147. Rev. Proc. 75-21, 1965-1 C.B. 715, 716.
148. Id.
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ity or type of property. 149 Of course, tax benefits are sometimes used
in ways not intended by Congress, as repeatedly illustrated by the
many abusive tax shelters promoted during the last two decades. 5 0
However, where taxpayers legitimately obtain tax benefits, the courts
should not legislate additional requirements on the conferral of such
benefits.
V. ALTERNATIVES TO THE PRIMARY TEST

Courts and Congress have developed other tools, aside from the primary test, to prevent overreaching by taxpayers. The sham transaction,' 5 ' substance over form, 152 step-transaction'53 and business
149.
150.
for the
15 1.

See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
See Miller, supra note 4, at 108-09 (stating that tax benefits often are provided
purpose of influencing taxpayer behavior and authorities cited therein).
See Kent N. Schneider & Ted D. Englebrecht, The Tax Court's Unified Approach

to Analyzing Generic Tax Shelters, 6 J. TAX'N

INVESTMENTS

308, 309-11 (1988). The

sham transaction doctrine was developed by courts to deny legal effect to transactions
that are fictitious. Id. at 309. Under this doctrine, the economic reality of a particular
transaction is evaluated to determine if the transaction has economic significance
beyond the tax benefits generated by the transaction (i.e., whether there is any
reasonable chance that the transaction will generate a profit). Id. at 310. The sham
transaction doctrine generally involves a two-step inquiry by courts into the business
purpose and economic substance of the transaction. Rose v. Commissioner, 88 T.C.
386, 408-409 (1987), aff'd, 868 F.2d 851 (6th Cir. 1989). The business purpose
inquiry involves consideration of the taxpayer's subjective purpose for entering the
transaction. Id. at 411. Courts generally look at both objective and subjective factors
to determine the taxpayer's objective in entering the transaction, i.e., whether the
taxpayer had an "actual and honest" profit objective. Id. at 411-12. Failure to establish
that a transaction had a business purpose other than tax avoidance will not result in the
transaction being classified as a sham if the taxpayer can establish the presence of the
second part of the test-economic substance. Id. at 408 n. 17. Economic substance
means that a transaction has some economic effect, other than tax consequences. Id.
See also Packard v. Commissioner, 85 T.C. 397, 417-18 (1985) (holding that a
transaction is a sham if the taxpayer was motivated by no business purposes other than
obtaining tax benefits in entering the transaction and the transaction has no economic
substance because no reasonable possibility of a profit exists). If a transaction lacks
economic substance, the taxpayer will not be entitled to deduct expenses claimed in
connection with the transaction. Id. at 416.
152. Under the substance over form doctrine, the court looks beyond the form in
which the taxpayer has cast a particular transaction to analyze the underlying substance
of the transaction. For example, where a taxpayer characterizes a transfer of money to a
third party as a loan by executing all of the necessary documents, but the third party
never makes any payments on the loan, the court may consider whether the parties
actually intended for the transfer to constitute a valid debt. See BTrrKER & MCMAHON,
supra note 133, at 1.3; see, e.g., Schuyler M. Moore, Form v. Substance: When Will
Courts Respect the Form of a Transaction?, 66 J. TAX'N 66 (1987); Alan Gunn, Tax
Avoidance, 76 MICH. L. REV. 733 (1978).
153. Closely related to the substance over form doctrine, the step transaction
doctrine seeks to ascertain the "real" nature of a multi-step transaction by looking at all
of the steps of a transaction as a whole. See BORIS BrFTKER & JAMES S. EUSTICE, FEDERAL
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purpose doctrines' 54 represent judicially-created principles courts use
to deny the particular tax effect sought by a taxpayer where the transaction or the form of the transaction lacks substance or business purpose. These doctrines, although often treated as interchangeable by
the courts, serve as an effective method
of preventing abuse of tax
5
Code."
the
under
provided
benefits
In addition to these judicial doctrines, in the Tax Reform Act of
1986,156 Congress enacted several provisions to combat what it
perceived to be a proliferation of "abusive" tax shelters. These provisions included an expansion of the existing at-risk rules, and rules
15 7
providing limitations on the deduction of so-called "passive" losses.
14.51 (5th ed. 1987); Moore,
supra note 152, at 68 (discussing the use of sham transaction doctrine in tax shelter
cases). Courts have applied the step-transaction doctrine in three instances: (i) where,
at the time the first step is taken, there is a binding commitment to take the later step,
(ii) where the legal or economic effect of one step would have been nonexistent in the
absence of the other steps taken, and (iii) where the end result indicates that the separate
steps are merely parts of a prearranged transaction designed to achieve the ultimate
intended result. See BIrKER & MCMAHON, supra note 133, 1.3 at 1-29; Robert W.
Wood, Is the Step Transaction Doctrine Still a Threat for Taxpayers?, 72 J. TAX'N 296
(1990).
154. The business purpose doctrine was originally established by the Supreme Court
in Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465 (1935). Gregory involved a taxpayer/shareholder who created a new corporation for the purpose of avoiding taxation resulting from
distribution by the original corporation of marketable securities to the taxpayer. Id. at
469. The Supreme Court determined that the new corporation had been formed for the
sole purpose of avoiding taxation, holding that the transaction was "a mere device
which put on the form of a corporate reorganization as a disguise for concealing its real
character." Id. The existence of a business purpose prevents an activity from being
characterized as a sham. Id.
155. See, e.g., Estate of Baron v. Commissioner, 798 F.2d 65, 71 (2d Cir. 1986);
Brannen v. Commissioner, 722 F.2d 695, 704 (11th Cir. 1984); Flowers v.
Commissioner, 80 T.C. 914, 915 (1983); Pitts v. Commissioner, 63 T.C.M. (CCH)
1742, 1746 (1992); Miller v. Commissioner, 52 T.C.M. (CCH) 239, 242 (1986); Seely
v. Commissioner, 51 T.C.M. (CCH) 1087, 1093 (1986) (stating that taxpayer invested
in "S" corporation, not in partnership); Harmon v. Commissioner, 51 T.C.M. (CCH)
1491, 1498 (1986); see also BITTKER & MCMAHON, supra note 133,
1.3 at 1-22
(noting that in applying the Code, courts distinguish between "tax avoidance" and "tax
evasion" and also between "form" and "substance," taking transactions at face value for
tax purposes only if they are imbued with a "business purpose" or "reflect economic
reality").
156. Pub. L. No. 99-514, 100 Stat. 2085 (1986).
157. I.R.C. §§ 465, 469 (1995). Originally enacted under the Tax Reform Act of
1976, the purpose of the at-risk rules codified in § 465 of the Code is to prevent
taxpayers from deducting losses from an activity in excess of their actual investment in
the activity. Pub. L. No. 94-455, 90 Stat. 1531 (1995). Prior to 1986, the at-risk rules
were fairly limited in their application. Id. The Tax Reform Act of 1986 expanded the
at-risk rules to limit deductions for business expenses paid or incurred in connection
with highly leveraged investments such as tax shelters. See BITrKER & MCMAHON,
supra note 133, at
19.4 (discussing at-risk rules under § 465); Thomas G. Tracy &
INCOME TAXATION OF CORPORATIONS AND SHAREHOLDERS
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Despite the decrease in the promotion of tax shelters as investments
since the enactment of the Tax Reform Act of 1986, courts continue to58
apply the "primary" profit objective test in the business context.
The problems with the primary test justify a continuing concern
because even when a taxpayer invests in an activity that is not considered to be an "abusive" tax shelter, the taxpayer must take into
account the available tax benefits. A recent Tax Court case, Warden v.
Commissioner,59 provides an example of the kinds of cases in which
the IRS and the Tax Court currently apply the primary test. In
Warden, the taxpayers owned and operated a yacht for charter 60 The
taxpayers took steps consistent with operating the boat for profit, such
as maintaining a detailed log of the use and maintenance of the boat,
running advertisements in the classified section of the newspaper, and
paying for a listing in the yellow pages of the local phone book.' 6 1
However, due to mechanical difficulties with the boat, the taxpayers
only chartered the boat several times and ended up attempting to sell
the boat at a loss several years later.' 62
Mike Johnston, The Effect of the Tax Reform Act of 1986 on Tax Shelters, 17 TAX
ADVISER 696, 706-10 (1986). Under § 465, taxpayers are not entitled to deduct losses
from activities in excess of the amount the taxpayer is "at-risk." I.R.C. § 465(a)(1)
(1995). Taxpayers are considered "at-risk" for the amounts of money and the adjusted
basis of property contributed to the activity: I.R.C. § 465(b)(l)(A) (1995). In addition, taxpayers are considered at risk-for amounts of money borrowed in connection with
the activity where the taxpayer is personally liable for the borrowed amount and where
the taxpayer has pledged property as security for the debt (but only to the extent of net
fair market value of the pledged property). I.R.C. § 465(b)(l)(B), (b)(2)-(b)(6) (1995).
Under the Tax Reform Act of 1986, subject to certain rules and limitations, "passive"
losses generally can be applied only against passive income. See I.R.C. § 469 (1995);
see also BITrKER & MCMAHON, supra note 133, at 1 19.5 (discussing passive loss rules);
Ivan H. Humphreys, Tax Shelters: The Search for Passive Income, 4 J. TAX'N
INVESTMENTS 289 (1986) (stating that it is clear taxpayers expecting passive losses are
seeking passive income to "soak-up" those passive losses); Tracy & Johnston, supra, at
696-706 (noting that subject to certain exceptions, net passive activity losses and
credits cannot be applied against other income of an individual). "Passive" losses are
those losses generated by "passive" activities. Humphreys, supra, at 290. A passive
activity is defined as one in which the taxpayer does not "materially participate." I.R.C.
§ 469(c) (1995). Rental activity is almost always treated as passive activity. I.R.C. §
469(c)(2) (1995). "Material participation" requires active involvement by the taxpayer
in the operations of the activity. I.R.C. § 469(h) (1995). Merely approving decisions
made by a paid advisor is not sufficient to constitute material participation. I.R.C. §
469(c)(2) (1995). See generally BITTKER & MCMAHON, supra note 133, at 19.3
(describing other statutory measures enacted specifically to deal with abusive tax
shelters).
158. See supra notes 133-34.
159. 69 T.C.M. (CCH) 2432 (1995).
160. Id. at 2433.
161. Id. at 2434.
162. Id. at 2437.
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The Tax Court found that, although the taxpayers "honestly hoped
that their yachting activity would generate a profit," the taxpayers
failed to show that their primary objective was to earn a profit.163 In
so holding, the court pointed to "significant" recreational elements as
the taxpayer's reason for engaging in the activity. 64 Had the court
applied the actual and honest test rather65 than the primary test, it might
well have reached a different holding.
VI.

CONCLUSION

The lack of statutory support for a primary test, the fact that such a
test is inherently inconsistent with the process of individual decisionmaking, and the range of alternative measures available to curtail
abusive investments, reveal that the primary test is simply not viable.
Courts should apply the actual and honest test to determine whether an
activity has been entered into or carried on "for profit."
Measuring or comparing various taxpayer objectives is unrealistic in
the business context, where taxpayers concurrently attempt to further
several objectives, including earning a profit. Applying the actual and
honest test in the business context does not require courts to measure
the amount or degree of a taxpayer's profit objective. Unlike the primary test, the actual and honest test provides courts and taxpayers with
clear-cut guidelines regarding which activities will be treated as "for
profit" activities under section 162 of the Code. Applied in combination with the at-risk rules, the passive activity loss rules, and the
judicially devised doctrines described above, the actual and honest test
assures that taxpayers who make investment decisions solely for tax
reasons will not be entitled to take deductions for expenses claimed in
connection with those investments.

163.
164.
165.

Id. at 2438.
Id.
See id.

